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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FEDERALISM DOCTRINES AND ABORTION CASES:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR FALLON

ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR.*

INTRODUCTION
In his Article If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a
Post-Roe World,1 Professor Richard Fallon argues that if the Supreme Court
were to overrule Roe v. Wade,2 courts might well remain in the “abortionumpiring business.”3 It is imaginable, he explains—perhaps even likely—that,
post-Roe, state and federal actors would regulate abortion in ways raising
serious constitutional questions. States might attempt to regulate abortions
beyond their borders, or Congress might enact a national abortion regulation.4
Such acts, if they occurred, could give rise to serious constitutional questions
of federal and state authority to regulate.5
Professor Fallon surely is correct that in a post-Roe world state and federal
actors might seek to regulate abortion in ways that would raise serious
constitutional questions.6 An important question that follows upon his thesis,
however, is the extent to which in analyzing these questions the Court would
engage in the same kind of constitutional analysis in which it has engaged in
Roe and its progeny—that is, an analysis balancing a state’s interests in
protecting life against a pregnant woman’s interests in choosing to terminate
her pregnancy. In both Roe and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of abortion

* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law; John Cardinal O’Hara, C.S.C.
Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a PostRoe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611 (2007).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Professor Fallon thus responds to Justice Scalia’s observation in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey that overturning Roe would remove the courts from the
“abortion-umpiring business.” 505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992).
4. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 613.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 611–14.
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regulations with reference to standards specifically tailored to account for state
and individual interests in the practice of abortion.7
The fact, however, that a case involves abortion does not necessarily mean
that the Court would resolve it under the kind of balancing standard that it
applied in Roe and Casey. In Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont,8 for
example, a nonprofit corporation that urged alternatives to abortion argued that
the Federal Election Campaign Act was unconstitutional insofar as it banned
corporate contributions in certain federal elections.9 Though the case related to
abortion, the Court resolved it with reference not to competing state and
individual interests in the practice of abortion, but to First Amendment
principles governing the constitutionality of restrictions on campaign
contributions.10 Thus, in addition to abortion-related cases that the Court has
resolved according to standards tailored to account for competing interests in
the practice of abortion (what I call “abortion-dependent” standards), there are
abortion-related cases that the Court has resolved according to standards that
account for interests that are not specific to the practice of abortion (what I call
“non-abortion-dependent” standards).
This is not to say that it is easy to classify all abortion-related cases as
involving either an abortion-dependent or a non-abortion-dependent standard.
There are cases relating to abortion that the Court has professed to resolve
according to non-abortion-dependent standards but that, it has been argued, the
Court really resolved according to abortion-dependent standards. In Madsen v.
Women’s Health Center,11 for instance, the Court had to select the appropriate
First Amendment test for analyzing the constitutionality of an injunction
against anti-abortion protestors.12 The Court professed to select the test it did
(“the challenged provisions of the injunction [must] burden no more speech
than necessary to serve a significant government interest” rather than survive
“strict scrutiny”) according to a non-abortion-dependent principle, namely that

7. In Roe, the Court balanced a state’s interest “in protecting potential life” against a
woman’s interest in having a choice to decide “whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” 410
U.S. at 153–54; see id. at 154 (“We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy
includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered
against important state interests in regulation.”). In Casey, the plurality analyzed the
constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute regulating abortion by balancing “the State’s interest in
life” and “the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy.” 505 U.S. at 869. The plurality
determined that “a law designed to further the State’s interest in fetal life” may not impose “an
undue burden on the woman’s decision before fetal viability.” Id. at 877. A majority of the
Supreme Court applied this “undue burden” test in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
8. 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
9. Id. at 149–50.
10. Id. at 152–63.
11. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
12. Id. at 757, 764–75.
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the case involved an injunction rather than a generally applicable ordinance.13
In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the Court chose to apply the legal test it
did because it disapproved of the actions of the protestors in light of the
strength it attributed to a woman’s interest in procuring an abortion.14 Quoting
Justice O’Connor, Justice Scalia argued that “no legal rule or doctrine is safe
from ad hoc nullification by this Court when an occasion for its application
arises in a case involving state regulation of abortion.”15 In other words, he
argued, disagreements on the Court over the constitutionality of abortion
regulations prevented the Court “from evenhandedly applying uncontroversial
legal doctrines” to abortion-related cases.16
This Essay will assess how, post-Roe, the Court might resolve
constitutional questions of federal-state authority over abortion-related matters
according to abortion-dependent or non-abortion-dependent standards.17 The
constitutional questions I address include those that Professor Fallon has
identified in his Article,18 as well some I independently identify here.
Analyzing whether the Court would resolve these questions according to
abortion-dependent or non-abortion-dependent standards helps bring into focus
how the constitutional landscape might appear were the Court to overturn Roe
v. Wade. It also permits some preliminary observations concerning the nature
of the role the Court has carved out for itself in evaluating questions of state
authority in contrast to questions of federal authority.
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I examines questions of state power
to regulate abortion in a post-Roe world. It explains that the Court (or
individual Justices) seemingly would analyze important questions of state
power to regulate abortion according to abortion-dependent standards. Part II
examines questions of federal power to regulate abortion in a post-Roe world.

13. Id. at 765.
14. Id. at 785 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
15. Id. (quoting Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
814 (1986) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
16. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 785 (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
17. Of course, it is not necessarily the case that the Court as a whole would analyze any
particular post-Roe constitutional question relating to abortion according to an agreed-upon
standard. For some issues, certain Justices might analyze it according to an abortion-dependent
standard and others according to a non-abortion-dependent standard. How a Justice selects a
standard, however, may depend not on a normative commitment to the relative interests that the
practice of abortion implicates, but on a normative commitment to the way in which courts more
generally should resolve constitutional questions of the relative power of the federal and state
governments.
18. This Essay does not take up all questions that Professor Fallon identifies (which include
the authority of states to retrospectively enforce pre-Roe regulations of abortion and certain First
Amendment issues, see Fallon, supra note 1, at 616, 640), but only those concerning the powers
of state and federal governments to directly regulate abortion.
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The federal government might regulate abortion directly, as Professor Fallon
suggests. Alternatively, if states attempted to regulate abortion beyond their
borders, Congress might respond not by prohibiting or allowing abortion, nor
by simply leaving the matter to the states and courts to sort out, but by
regulating state authority to regulate abortion. That is, Congress might
regulate the authority of the states to regulate abortion extraterritorially. This
Part identifies the standards by which the Court (or individual Justices) might
analyze such questions. It explains that, in contrast to how the Court
seemingly would analyze important questions of state power, the Court
seemingly would analyze questions of federal power according to nonabortion-dependent standards—that is, standards that do not involve assessing
the strength of a state’s interest in protecting life or a woman’s interest in
procuring an abortion.
Part III draws upon the analyses in Parts I and II to suggest a broader
perspective on the role that the Court has assumed for itself in evaluating
questions of state authority in contrast to questions of federal authority. In
analyzing questions implicated here of state power to regulate given
transactions, the Court has embraced discretionary standards entailing a
judicial assessment of state interests in regulating a given subject-matter in a
given way. In analyzing questions of federal power relative to states, in
contrast, the Court has employed standards that implicate interests
transcending government interests in particular regulatory outcomes. Thus,
regarding questions of state authority to regulate abortion, the judicial analysis
might turn on the strength of a state’s interest in protecting unborn life.
Regarding questions of federal authority to regulate abortion or regulate how
states regulate abortion, judicial analysis might turn on commitments to
principles of federalism. Whether, post-Roe, then, the Court would remain
involved in assessing the strength of state and individual interests in the
practice of abortion may well depend on what kind of federal or state
regulation emerged in a post-Roe world.
I. STATE POWER TO REGULATE ABORTION
Professor Fallon identifies several questions regarding state power to
regulate abortion that could arise if the Court were to overturn Roe. These
include questions of whether a state law prohibiting citizens from obtaining
abortions in other states would violate the Full Faith and Credit or Due Process
Clauses, the “negative” implications of the Commerce Clause, or the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV. As this Part explains, the Due Process,
Full Faith and Credit, and Dormant Commerce Clause questions implicate
competing standards, abortion-dependent and non-abortion-dependent, from
which the Justices would have to choose. The Privileges and Immunities

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

FEDERALISM DOCTRINES AND ABORTION CASES

771

Clause question implicates non-abortion-dependent standards that appear,
however, to be particularly susceptible to abortion-dependent refashioning.19
A.

Full Faith and Credit, Due Process, and the “Negative” Commerce
Clauses: Competing Standards

There are at least two questions that, should they arise in a post-Roe world,
would require the Court to choose between competing standards, abortiondependent and non-abortion-dependent. Both questions could arise if a state
attempted to regulate abortions sought or procured in another state. To borrow
Professor Fallon’s hypothetical, suppose that State A prohibited its citizens
from procuring an abortion in another state, or prohibited an out-of-state doctor
from performing an abortion on a citizen of State A.20 Such prohibitions could
implicate two constitutional questions: (1) What authority does a state have to
regulate abortions procured out of state in light of the Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit Clauses? (2) What authority does a state have to regulate
abortions procured out of state in light of the Commerce Clause?
1.

Full Faith and Credit and Due Process

There does not appear to be Supreme Court precedent resolving what
authority states have to regulate out-of-state abortions in light of the Due
Process21 and Full Faith and Credit Clauses.22 This question is essentially a
conflict-of-laws one: What authority does a state have under the Constitution
to apply its own laws in a case arising out of a particular transaction against a
19. Of course, there is one issue Professor Fallon identifies that could arise relative to state
or federal regulation that surely would implicate an abortion-dependent standard: whether a state
could constitutionally prohibit abortions necessary to save the life of the mother. See Fallon,
supra note 1, at 625–26. To resolve this question, as Professor Fallon explains, the Court
unavoidably would have to engage in balancing of a pregnant woman’s interest in her life and
state interests in unborn life, a kind of balancing that is the hallmark of the Roe and Casey
analyses. Id. at 626.
20. See id. at 628.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”).
22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State . . . .”). As Professor Fallon
explains, in Bigelow v. Virginia, the Supreme Court reversed a Virginia court’s conviction of the
editor of a Virginia newspaper for printing an advertisement for an abortion service in New York.
421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975). The Court wrote in that case that
[t]he Virginia legislature could not have regulated the advertiser’s activity in New York,
and obviously could not have prescribed the activity in that State. Neither could Virginia
prevent its residents from traveling to New York to obtain those services, or, as the state
conceded, prosecute them for going there.
Id. at 822–24 (citations omitted). As Professor Fallon rightly observes, even if this language were
not deemed dictum, “the categorical claim that states may never enact or enforce extraterritorial
criminal legislation seems too strong.” Fallon, supra note 1, at 629.
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competing claim that the laws of another state should apply? The Court has
taken two approaches to such questions. One is a balancing approach. Under
the balancing approach, the question is whether State A had “a significant
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that
choice of its law [would be] neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”23 To
assess whether a state had sufficient “interests” in regulating out-of-state
abortions, the Court presumably would have to assess a state’s interests in
protecting unborn life conceived in one of its citizens relative to the interests of
that citizen in availing herself of the abortion benefits of the laws of another
state.24 In making such an assessment, the Court would be balancing the
interests of states seeking to protect unborn life and women seeking abortions
that the Court balanced in Roe and Casey. Accordingly, were the Court to
address the question whether a State constitutionally may prohibit it citizens
from seeking out-of-state abortions according to an “interest analysis,” it likely
would be choosing a standard that, in application, would be abortiondependent.
It is not certain, however, that the Court would resolve the question of state
constitutional authority under the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
Clauses to regulate out-of-state abortions according to an “interest analysis.”
The Court (or individual Justices) might invoke a more categorical rule based
on historical practice. In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,25 the Court had to resolve
whether a forum state could apply its own statute of limitations to claims that
in substance the law of another state must govern.26 Rather than engage in an
interest analysis, the Court held that under “long established and still subsisting
choice-of-law practices,” statutes of limitation are procedural and thus within
the legislative competence of a forum state to apply as governing law in cases
brought within its jurisdiction.27 Accordingly, the Court concluded, under the
Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses, a state categorically may apply
its own statute of limitations in cases brought before its own courts.
If long established choice-of-law practices can operate to define the
legislative competence of a state, there is an argument to be made that a state
generally has legislative competence to regulate the activities of its citizens, instate or out-of-state—in some circumstances by criminal sanction. Certain
early nineteenth century accounts of the law of nations recognized a sovereign
prerogative in states to regulate their citizens no matter where they were. As
Joseph Story explained in his famous treatise on the conflict of laws:

23. Phillips Petrol. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981) (plurality opinion)).
24. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 629–30.
25. 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
26. Id. at 719.
27. Id. at 722–30.
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[N]ations generally assert a claim to regulate the rights, duties, obligations, and
acts of their own citizens, wherever they may be domiciled. And, so far as
these rights, duties, obligations, and acts afterwards come under the
cognizance of the tribunals of the sovereign power of their own country, either
for enforcement, or for protection, or for remedy, there may be no just ground
28
to exclude this claim.

Thus, according to Story, “every nation has a right to bind its own subjects by
its own laws in every other place.”29
Some nineteenth century courts suggested that this principle applied to
certain criminal regulations. In 1819, in Commonwealth v. Gaines,30 the
General Court of Virginia explained that “the Law of Nations recognizes the
right of a State to punish its own citizens for the commission of crimes either
of lesae majestatis, or of other dangerous and injurious tendencies, out of its
own territorial limits.”31 Moreover, the court explained, in England “it is not
thought absurd, nor has it been unusual to enact Statutes by which their
subjects are punished for offences committed out of the Realm.”32 In 1863, in
Chandler v. Main,33 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin explained that “it seems
to be well established, that every nation has the right to punish its own citizens
for the violation of its laws, wherever committed.”34
Other writers suggested that a state only had jurisdiction to punish citizens
for acts committed abroad when the offense was particularly injurious to the
state. In People v. Tyler,35 Judge Isaac Christiancy of the Supreme Court of
Michigan explained that “every sovereignty has the right, subject to certain
restrictions, to protect itself from, and to punish as crimes, certain acts which
are particularly injurious to its rights or interests, or those of its citizens,
wherever committed.”36 Thus, he explained:
without attempting to enumerate all, the citizen may commit treason by acts or
combinations abroad; the commerce of a nation may be injured, or its pacific
relations with other governments endangered, by the criminal conduct of the

28. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC,
REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO
MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS 451 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray &
Co. 1834).
29. Id. at 22.
30. 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 172 (1819).
31. Id. at 176.
32. Id.
33. 16 Wis. 398 (1863).
34. Id. at 419.
35. 7 Mich. 161 (1859).
36. Id. at 221 (Christiancy, J., concurring).
IN
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crews or passengers of its ships in foreign ports. In such cases the offender
37
may be punished by the government of which he is a citizen . . . .

In his famous treatise on the conflict of laws, Francis Wharton asserted that a
state may apply its criminal laws to certain offenses committed by its citizens
extraterritorially—offenses committed on the high seas, political offenses,
forgery, and homicides.38 In 1941, in Skiriotes v. Florida,39 the Supreme Court
upheld state authority to criminally regulate the conduct of a citizen
extraterritorially under one of these categories—offenses committed on the
high seas.40 In Skiriotes, the Court explained that “a criminal statute dealing
with acts that are directly injurious to the government, and are capable of
perpetration without regard to particular locality is to be construed as
applicable to citizens of the United States upon the high seas or in a foreign
country.”41 Likewise, the Court explained, “[i]f the United States may control
the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas, we see no reason why the State
of Florida may not likewise govern the conduct of its citizens upon the high
seas with respect to matters in which the State has a legitimate interest.”42
Citing Skiriotes, a Comment in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
explains that “[a]n individual State of the United States . . . has jurisdiction to
apply its local law in certain instances to its absent citizens.”43
If the Court were to identify a historical practice recognizing state
authority to apply criminal laws extraterritorially to citizens, it could hold that
a state may prohibit its citizens from seeking abortions in other states without
assessing the strength of the state’s interest in the prohibition. This holding
would reflect a non-abortion-dependent principle—that a state may apply its
criminal laws extraterritorially. If, rather, the Court were to identify only a
narrower historical understanding—that states may apply criminal laws
extraterritorially to citizens only when they have a demonstrable “legitimate
interest” in doing so or when the regulated conduct is “particularly injurious”
to the state—the Court might have to assess the strength of the state’s interest
(historically understood or absolutely) in prohibiting its citizens from seeking

37. Id. at 221–22.
38. FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS OR PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, INCLUDING A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF ANGLO-AMERICAN, ROMAN,
GERMAN, AND FRENCH JURISPRUDENCE §§ 858–75 (Phil., Kay & Brother 1872).
39. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
40. Id. at 77.
41. Id. at 73–74.
42. Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 9, cmt. F (1971) (emphasis added).
In light of the history of this precedent, it has been argued that Bigelow is the only Supreme Court
“decision calling into question the extraterritorial authority of states over citizens.” Mark P.
Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of Laws, 73 IOWA L. REV. 893, 907 n.94 (1988) (citing Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)).
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abortions in other states. This assessment could constitute an abortiondependent inquiry into the sufficiency of a state’s interest in prohibiting its
citizens from obtaining abortions in other states.
2.

Dormant Commerce Clause

A second question regarding a state’s power to regulate activities that
occur extraterritorially is whether the Commerce Clause44 imposes any
limitations upon its ability to do so. The Court has held that the Commerce
Clause not only authorizes congressional regulation of commerce, but also, by
“negative” implication, precludes certain forms of state regulation affecting
commerce. There are two strands to the Court’s so-called “negative”
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. First, the Court has held that the Commerce
Clause prohibits “state regulations that unjustifiably discriminate on their face
against out-of-state entities.”45 Moreover, the Court has held that the
Commerce Clause may, under a balancing test, preclude state regulations that
do not discriminate facially against out-of-state entities. In Pike v. Bruce
Church,46 the Court explained that if a state law “regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”47
“[T]he extent of the burden that will be tolerated,” the Court explained, will
“depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”48
A state law prohibiting citizens from procuring abortions in state or out of
state would not seem to discriminate against out-of-state citizens.
Accordingly, the issue for the Court would be whether a state law prohibiting a
citizen from procuring an out-of-state abortion imposed an excessive burden
on commerce relative to the state’s interest in the regulation. In applying this
test to a state law prohibiting citizens from procuring out-of-state abortions, the
Court would have to assess the “legitimacy” and “nature” of a state’s interest
in protecting unborn life relative to the burden that the prohibition would
impose on interstate commerce. Professor Fallon observes that, in applying
this test, a court would have to assess a state’s interest in protecting unborn life
in apparently the same way it has assessed it under the frameworks of Roe and
Casey.49 Rather than assess whether the burden a state imposed on an
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”).
45. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Com’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005) (citing
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)).
46. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
47. Id. at 142.
48. Id.
49. Fallon, supra note 1, at 637.
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individual’s interest in an abortion was “undue,” as courts do under Casey,50
the Court would assess whether the burden on commerce was “undue.” The
analysis would be abortion-dependent insofar as the Court would have to
assess whether the “burden” on commerce was justified relative to a state’s
interest in protecting unborn life.
It is worth noting that two Justices have categorically rejected this
balancing test as a means of giving effect to the Commerce Clause. Justices
Scalia and Thomas have argued that “[t]he historical record provides no
grounds for reading the Commerce Clause to be other than what it says—an
authorization for Congress to regulate commerce.”51 In other words, they
believe that the Commerce Clause does not operate to negative state laws of its
own force. On grounds of stare decisis, they would “enforce a self-executing
‘negative’ Commerce Clause . . . against a state law that facially discriminates
against interstate commerce”;52 they would not, however, invoke the Pike
balancing test in situations to which the Court has yet to apply it. Under their
view, a state categorically would not violate the Commerce Clause by
prohibiting its citizens from procuring out-of-state abortions. There would be
no need for the Court to assess a state’s interest in protecting unborn life to
uphold the regulation. Thus, they would analyze the “negative” Commerce
Clause issue according to a non-abortion-dependent standard, whereas other
Justices seemingly would analyze it according to an abortion-dependent
standard.
B.

Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV: Non-Abortion-Dependent
Standards Susceptible to Abortion-Dependent Refashioning

The preceding section deemed certain standards abortion-dependent
because, in applying them to determine state authority to regulate abortion
extraterritorially, the Court would have to assess the strength of a state’s
interest in protecting unborn life. It deemed other standards non-abortiondependent because, in applying them to determine state authority to regulate
abortion, the Court would strain credulity to self-consciously assess a state’s
interest in unborn life or a woman’s interest in an abortion: these standards by
their terms serve interests not specific to the practice of abortion. That said,
certain issues of state power to regulate abortion that could arise post-Roe
50. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this
decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause.”).
51. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 209 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 263 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s
concurring opinion.
52. Id. at 210.
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implicate standards that appear by their terms to be non-abortion-dependent
but that are sufficiently ill-defined as to be particularly susceptible to abortiondependent refashioning.
The question whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV53
prevents a state from prohibiting its citizens from procuring out-of-state
abortions implicates such a standard. As Professor Fallon describes, scholars
have asserted two competing visions of the operation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause in this context.54 Professor Mark Rosen has argued that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause precludes a state from imposing
discriminatory burdens on citizens of other states; it does not prohibit a state
from regulating the out-of-state activities of its own citizens.55 Under this rule,
the Privileges and Immunities Clause categorically would not preclude a state
from prohibiting its citizens from seeking out-of-state abortions. There would
be no need for a court, in reaching this conclusion, to balance a citizen’s
interest in obtaining an abortion against the state’s interest in protecting unborn
life. Accordingly, application of the rule would not be abortion-dependent.
Contrariwise, Professor Seth Kreimer has argued that under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, a citizen of State A who visits State B is “‘entitled’ to
local privileges and immunities” of State B.56 In other words, when a nonCalifornian enters California, that person has a “right as a citizen of the United
States to be treated with the same respect shown to native Californians.”57 On
its face, this theory of the Privileges and Immunities Clause appears to be nonabortion-dependent. If a visiting non-citizen is entitled to all benefits that a
state affords its citizens, the non-citizen would be entitled to procure an
abortion not because it is an abortion, but because it is something to which
citizens are entitled.
Even if Professor Kreimer’s theory is generally correct, the principle it
asserts cannot be “absolute.”58 First, the Court has explained that “[o]nly with
respect to those ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ bearing upon the vitality of the
Nation as a single entity must the state treat all citizens, resident and
nonresident, equally.”59 Moreover, the Court has explained that a state may
have a “substantial reason” for discriminating against citizens of other states,

53. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the several States.”).
54. Fallon, supra note 1, at 633–35.
55. Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 897–903 (2002).
56. Seth F. Kreimer, “But Whoever Treasures Freedom . . .”: The Right to Travel and
Extraterritorial Abortions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 907, 919 (1993).
57. Id. at 917.
58. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999) (explaining that the protections of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV are not “absolute”).
59. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
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for example, for requiring them to pay more for a hunting license,60 to enroll in
a state university,61 or to vote or hold elective public office.62 If a court were
to accept Professor Kreimer’s view but account for these principles, it would
have to assess whether the benefit of procuring an abortion in State B was the
kind of benefit to which the Privileges and Immunities Clause entitles a citizen
of State A when in State B.63 In making this determination, a court might
normatively assess the value of the benefit of being able to procure an
abortion, the assessment that lies at the heart of Roe and Casey. Accordingly,
Professor Kreimer’s theory of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV sets up a standard that appears in formulation to be non-abortion-dependent
but that in application might prove actually to be abortion-dependent.
C. Summary
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that there is no question of state
power to regulate abortion extraterritorially that the Court, without question,
would resolve under a non-abortion-dependent standard.
To state it
affirmatively, it is possible, if not likely, that the Court would address most
questions of state authority to regulate abortion examined here under abortiondependent standards. The Court might resolve state authority under the Full
Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses to prohibit citizens from obtaining
out-of-state abortions by assessing the strength of state interests under the
Allstate interest analysis. If the Court were to pursue whether, under
traditional choice-of-law principles, it was understood that states could
criminally regulate citizens’ out-of-state conduct, it might categorically
recognize a power to so regulate. But it might also discover a tradition under
which courts assessed whether a state had a “legitimate interest” in making
such a criminal regulation. Moreover, in a “negative” Commerce Clause
analysis, the Court likely would assess the nature of a state’s interest in
regulating abortions occurring beyond its borders. Finally, certain standards
that the Court might invoke under the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
though appearing non-abortion-dependent as formulated, could prove abortiondependent in application.
II. FEDERAL POWER TO REGULATE ABORTION
Professor Fallon also identifies questions regarding federal power to
regulate abortion that could arise if the Court were to overturn Roe.
Specifically, he identifies questions that would arise were Congress to directly

60.
61.
62.
63.

Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502 (citing Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 390–91).
Id. (citing Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 445 (1973)).
Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383.
See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
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prohibit or protect the practice of abortion.64 In addition to the issues that
Professor Fallon identifies, it is worth considering others. In controversial
areas such as gay marriage and tort reform, certain federal initiatives have
taken the form not of direct regulation of individuals, but of regulation of state
authority to regulate individuals. If states were to regulate abortion
extraterritorially, Congress might respond by defining what aspects of abortion
a state may permissibly regulate. Were Congress to prohibit or permit
extraterritorial state regulation of abortion, a host of constitutional questions
would arise regarding congressional power to do so.
As this Part explains, the Court likely would invoke non-abortiondependent standards to resolve most questions of federal power to regulate the
practice (or to regulate states’ regulation of the practice) of abortion.
A.

Federal Regulation of the Practice of Abortion: A Non-AbortionDependent Standard

Professor Fallon argues that under the Commerce Clause congressional
power to regulate abortions seems plain: “Abortions are services sold in
interstate commerce, and the business of providing medical care, including
abortions, is intertwined with commerce in innumerable ways.”65 In Gonzales
v. Raich,66 the Supreme Court explained that its “case law firmly establishes
Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic
‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”67
Even abortions performed on a non-commercial basis would seem, as
Professor Fallon explains, to be part of a class of activities—abortions
generally—for which there is an interstate market.68
It has been argued that the Court’s Commerce Clause standards are
sufficiently malleable that judges may apply them to reach politically desired
results.69 Regardless of whether this is true, the “substantial effects” test, by its
terms, is non-abortion-dependent. The test concerns the relation of an activity
to “commerce,” not the interest of a state in regulating an activity relative to
the interests of an individual to be free from such regulation. As Professor

64. Fallon, supra note 1, at 621–25.
65. Id. at 622–23.
66. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
67. Id. at 17.
68. Fallon, supra note 1, at 623; cf. Robert J. Pushaw, Does Congress Have the
Constitutional Power to Prohibit Partial-Birth Abortion?, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 319 (2005)
(arguing that the Court should sustain the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act “because the
performance of partial-birth abortions is ‘commerce’—the sale of a service in the market—that
has demonstrable effects ‘among the states’”).
69. See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 68, at 319 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s current Commerce
Clause standards . . . are malleable and therefore tend to be applied in light of each judge’s
politics and ideology.”).
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Fallon observes, a judge who was not prepared to accept the results of applying
the substantial effects test in the context of abortion because the context was
abortion (and who was committed to making an honest account of his or her
reasons for action) would have “to redefine and limit Congress’s commerce
power” itself,70 or rely on another constitutional provision as limiting
congressional power.71
It is not clear, however, whether, if Roe were overturned, any of the
Justices would be inclined to refashion the commerce power based on
normative commitments regarding abortion. In Raich, for instance, certain
Justices expressly subjugated normative commitments to policies underlying
the regulations at issue to commitments regarding the federal-state balance of
power. Justice Stevens, writing for a majority, described a federal prohibition
on the use of homegrown marijuana for medicinal purposes as “troubling.”72
Nonetheless, based on a normative commitment to the degree of federal power
he understands Congress to have under the Constitution, Justice Stevens wrote
for the Court to uphold the federal prohibition.73 In dissent, Justice O’Connor
made clear that she did not find a prohibition on the use of marijuana for
medical purposes troubling: “If I were a California citizen, I would not have
voted for the medical marijuana ballot initiative; if I were a California
legislator I would not have supported the Compassionate Use Act.”74
Nonetheless, she voted to hold the federal prohibition on the use of intrastate
marijuana for medicinal purposes unconstitutional.75 Rather than effectuate a
commitment in favor of the substance of the federal regulation, she would have
effectuated a commitment to limitations on federal authority to regulate. In
particular, she described a normative commitment to “[o]ne of federalism’s
chief virtues”—“that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility that
‘a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.’”76 Accordingly, she resolved that “whatever the wisdom of
California’s experiment with medical marijuana, the federalism principles that
have driven our Commerce Clause cases require that room for experiment be
protected in this case.”77

70. Fallon, supra note 1, at 624.
71. Id.
72. 545 U.S. at 9.
73. See id. (“The CSA is a valid exercise of federal power, even as applied to the troubling
facts of this case.”).
74. Id. at 57 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 42 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
77. Raich, 545 U.S. at 57 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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The point of this is simply that the standard by which the Court would
resolve whether Congress has commerce power to regulate the practice of
abortion would seemingly be a non-abortion-dependent one. The “substantial
effects” test in terms does not lend itself to weighing a state’s interest in
protecting unborn life against a woman’s interest in procuring an abortion. It
is not entirely clear, either, that a Justice otherwise disposed to refashion a
legal test to fit a desired result relating to the practice of abortion would in fact
so refashion the commerce power; there are potentially competing normative
commitments to federalism that might predominate.
B.

Federal Regulation of States’ Regulation of Abortion: Non-AbortionDependent Standards, Generally

It is conceivable that if Congress chose in a post-Roe world to regulate
abortion, it would not regulate abortion directly, but rather would regulate the
states’ authority to regulate abortion. Since Professor Fallon does not address
the possibility of such measures, I will analyze them here in more detail than I
have analyzed other measures.
In two famous situations of perceived “overregulation” by states, Congress
has responded (or been urged to respond) not by preempting state regulation
with a federal standard but by defining the limits of state authority. The first is
gay marriage. When Hawaii became the first state to recognize gay marriage,
the question arose whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause78 would require
other states to recognize all gay marriages that Hawaii recognized. To the
extent that the issue called for a national resolution, Congress did not provide
that gay marriage shall or shall not be a national institution. Rather, Congress
provided in the Defense of Marriage Act that one state need not recognize a
gay marriage that is recognized under the laws of another state.79 In effect,
Congress provided that a state has no authority to act in such a way as to
legally require another state to recognize a marriage between persons of the
same sex.
A second situation of perceived “overregulation” by the states is state court
jurisdiction in tort law cases. State courts have broad-based jurisdiction over
out-of-state business entities that have certain “minimum contacts” with the
jurisdiction. A perceived problem is that in certain instances plaintiffs forum78. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other state . . . .”).
79. Specifically, the Act provides:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to
give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory,
possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a
right or claim arising from such relationship.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
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shop for jurisdictions that have “plaintiff friendly” laws or juries. Opponents
of such forum-shopping and large recoveries in tort cases advocate “tort
reform.” Tort reform could entail Congress enacting uniform national
standards governing liability in personal injury, products liability, and medical
malpractice cases. Proposals for tort reform tend more, however, toward
limiting the jurisdiction of state courts in tort cases or providing procedures by
which state courts must adjudicate tort cases. For example, the Product
Liability Reform Act of 1998 would have regulated statutes of limitations and
repose in certain categories of state court litigation.80 The Lawsuit Abuse
Reduction Act of 2004,81 which passed the House of Representatives in 2004
and was reintroduced the following year,82 would have limited the jurisdiction
that state courts may exercise in personal injury cases. Specifically, it would
have required a tightened connection between, on the one hand, a state and, on
the other, the parties or the transaction underlying the plaintiff’s claim, for a
state court to exercise jurisdiction in personal injury cases.83 In effect, these
measures would not provide a federal standard governing tort actions; rather,
they would limit a state’s authority to adjudicate tort cases.
If states were to regulate abortion extraterritorially post-Roe, and the
conflict-of-laws issues this created were thought to warrant a national solution,
Congress might attempt to define the regulatory authority of states over
abortion rather than regulate abortion itself. Congress could do this in two
ways: it could provide (1) a choice-of-law rule or (2) a choice-of-forum rule.
Were Congress to provide either kind of rule, constitutional questions of
congressional power would arise, implicating competing standards among
which the Justices would have to choose.
1.

Choice-of-Law Regulation

Through a choice-of-law provision, Congress could favor the laws of a
state in the territory of which an abortion occurred, or the laws of a state of
which a person procuring an abortion was a citizen. To favor territorial
regulation, Congress could provide: “In any civil or criminal action arising
from or relating to an abortion, the laws of the State in which the abortion
occurs shall provide the rule of decision unless the Constitution, laws or
treaties of the United States shall otherwise require or provide.” To favor
regulation of citizens, Congress could substitute “of which the person seeking
the abortion is a citizen” for “in which the abortion occurs.” If Congress had
power to enact such regulations, its power would likely derive from the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV: “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in

80.
81.
82.
83.

S. 2236, 105th Cong. §§ 106, 107 (1998).
H.R. 4571, 108th Cong. (2004).
H.R. 420, 109th Cong. (2005).
Id. § 4(a).
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each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State; And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”84
Congressional power would derive from the highlighted portion, namely the
Effects Clause.
A congressional statute mandating that either the law of the state in which
an abortion occurred or the law of the state of which the person procuring an
abortion was a citizen shall govern would restrict states from exercising
powers that states traditionally have exercised.
As explained, states
traditionally have been understood to have authority to regulate the activities of
citizens, even to regulate certain activities that occur extraterritorially.85 And
there is unquestionably an established tradition of state constitutional authority
to regulate activities occurring within the territory of the state.86
The relationship between state power to regulate matters that states
traditionally have regulated and congressional power to limit that power under
the Effects Clause is unsettled. In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,87 the Court held
that a state had constitutional power to apply its own statute of limitations to
claims that in substance the laws of another state had to govern.88 The Court
premised this holding on “long established and still subsisting choice-of-law
practices.”89 That those practices may “come to be thought . . . unwise,” the
Court explained, does not mean that they “thereby become unconstitutional.”90
The Court proceeded to observe that if it becomes “desirable that forum States
no longer treat a particular issue as procedural for conflict of laws purposes,
those States can themselves adopt a rule to that effect,” or “it can be proposed
that Congress legislate to that effect under the second sentence of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.”91 It is revealing that here the Court confidently declared
that States can adopt a rule that they will apply the statutes of limitations of
other states, but less confidently declared that “it can be proposed” that
Congress require states to apply other states’ statutes of limitations. The Court
may have been reluctant to declare simply that “Congress may legislate to that

84. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
85. See supra notes 28–43 and accompanying text.
86. See generally STORY, supra note 28, at 19 (The first and most general maxim or
proposition [of International Jurisprudence] is that . . . every nation possesses an exclusive
sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory.”).
87. 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
88. Id. at 729
89. Id. at 728; see id. at 726 (explaining that “[t]he historical record shows conclusively, we
think, that the society which adopted the Constitution did not regard statutes of limitations as
substantive provisions, akin to the rules governing the validity and effect of contracts, but rather
as procedural restrictions fashioned by each jurisdiction for its own courts”).
90. Id. at 728–29.
91. Id. at 729 (emphasis added).
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effect” because the Court has never settled any substantial definition of
congressional power under the Effects Clause.92
Scholars have offered various theories of what power Congress has to
require a state to enforce the laws of another rather than its own under the
Effects Clause. These theories are generally non-abortion-dependent insofar as
each would define congressional power under the Effects Clause relative to
abortion regulation without performing a Roe-type consideration of competing
interests.
Professor Mark Rosen has usefully divided these theories into two
categories. The first category includes “Congressional Supremacy” theories.93
“Proponents of this approach view Congress’s plenary power as encompassing
both expansion and contraction of effect that a forum must give to another
state’s acts or judgments.”94 Under this theory, Congress’s authority to
prescribe a choice-of-law rule for the States is plenary and thus, in a post-Roe
world, would not depend on balancing interests relative to the practice of
abortion. The second category includes “Interstitial Power” theories.95 Under
these theories, “Congress has power to legislate only with respect to matters
about which the Supreme Court has not provided a full faith and credit rule.”96
There are two variations of these theories: (1) that Congress may enforce the
self-executing requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause where judicial
enforcement is insufficient; or (2) that Congress may require one state to give
more respect to the acts and judgments of another state than the Full Faith and
Credit Clause requires, but not less.97 Under neither variation would the Court
have to engage in a balancing of state and individual interests relative to
abortion to determine the scope of congressional power. Once the Court
identified the baseline of what the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires (an
exercise that could be abortion-dependent under an interest analysis, as
explained in the last Part),98 the question for the Court would be (1) whether
Congress was enforcing those requirements, no more and no less, or (2)
92. Congress has enacted legislation under the Effects Clause only five times, and the
Supreme Court has never considered a constitutional challenge on Effects Clause grounds. Mark
D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith
and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors That Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90
MINN. L. REV. 915, 965 & n.187 (2006) (explaining that Congress has legislated under the
Effects Clause only five times, describing those enactments, and observing that the enactments
have not been challenged in the Supreme Court on Effects Clause grounds). Accordingly, the
Court has not had occasion to meaningfully expound upon congressional power under the Effects
Clause.
93. Id. at 958.
94. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. at 959.
96. Id.
97. Rosen, supra note 92, at 959.
98. See supra notes 23–43 and accompanying text.
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whether Congress was requiring a state to give more faith and credit, but not
less.
Professor Rosen himself has offered a two-step approach to questions of
congressional power under the Effects Clause. Under his approach, courts first
should apply a “clear statement rule” to ensure that Congress has considered
interests of state autonomy and national unity “in the context in which the
statute is being applied.”99 Second, Professor Rosen argues that courts should
assess whether the rule Congress has enacted under the Effects Clause “is
reasonable, taking into account the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s twin goals of
creating a union and meaningfully empowering states.”100 Insofar as he
describes this inquiry as “intrinsically open ended,”101 it is possible that, under
the standard he proposes, a state’s interest in regulating abortion and a
woman’s interest in procuring an abortion could figure in the analysis. With
this exception, however, scholars have framed most theories of congressional
power under the Effects Clause in terms that would not lend themselves in
application to express consideration of the competing interests that underlie the
Court’s analyses in Roe and Casey.
2.

Choice-of-Forum Regulation

Another way for Congress to regulate the states’ regulation of abortion
would be to enact a choice-of-forum provision. Through a choice-of-forum
provision, Congress could control the law governing certain abortion disputes.
If, for example, State A were to criminally prohibit its citizens from procuring
abortions within or without State A, and State B were to allow any person
present in State B to legally procure an abortion, Congress could resolve this
conflict of laws by prescribing the forum in which criminal prosecutions
relating to abortion must be brought. If Congress wanted to favor the
territorial interests of a state, it might provide: “Any action against a person for
procuring or providing an abortion may be brought only in the courts of the
State in which the alleged abortion giving rise to the action was procured or
provided.” By requiring the action to be brought in the state in which the
abortion was performed, the Court would exclude the courts of another state
from trying to enforce a contrary regulation. If Congress wanted to favor the
interests of a state in regulating its citizens, it might provide: “Any action
against a person for procuring or providing an abortion may be brought only in
the courts of the State of which the person procuring the abortion giving rise to
the action is a citizen.” By requiring the action to be brought in the state of
which the person procuring an abortion was a citizen, the Court would exclude
the courts of another state from trying to enforce a contrary regulation.
99. Rosen, supra note 92, at 977.
100. Id. at 978.
101. Id.
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If Congress constitutionally may enact such regulation, the source of its
power likely would be the Commerce Clause.102 The Lawsuit Abuse
Reduction Act of 2005 (LARA), for example—a measure designed to regulate
the jurisdiction of state courts over tort claims—was introduced in Congress as
a regulation of interstate commerce.103 If Congress enacted a statute regulating
state court jurisdiction over state law actions, the statute would generate
difficult questions of congressional power.
The first set of questions would relate to whether a federal regulation of
state court jurisdiction would be a regulation of “commerce” under the
Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court explained in Gonzales v. Raich104 that
its “case law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local
activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.”105 One question that would arise
under this test is whether a federal law regulating state court jurisdiction
qualifies as a regulation of “economic” or “commercial” activity.106 In United
States v. Morrison,107 the Court held that Congress exceeded its powers under
the Commerce Clause when it enacted the Violence Against Women Act of
1994 in part because “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any
sense of the phrase, economic activity.”108 The Court maintained this element
of the Commerce Clause inquiry in Raich, finding that the class of regulated
activities under the Controlled Substances Act, unlike gender-motivated
violence, was “quintessentially economic.”109
Accordingly, were Congress to regulate the state fora in which abortion
cases could be brought, the Court would have to resolve what constituted the
regulated activity and whether it was itself “economic,” or part of a larger class

102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”).
103. The House Report on the Act explained:
Congress unquestionably has the authority to regulate economic activities that “affect”
interstate commerce, and forum shopping clearly has a substantial affect on interstate
commerce by allowing opportunities for personal injury lawyers to exploit lax venue and
forum non conveniens rules to pick and choose those courts with a reputation for
consistently awarding near-limitless awards. Section 4 of the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction
Act clearly applies to economic activities, as the definition of “personal injury claim” is a
claim “to recover” for a person’s personal injury. Such a provision is entirely consistent
with federalism principles.
H.R. REP. NO. 109–123, at 35 (2005).
104. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
105. Id. at 17.
106. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110
YALE L.J. 947 (2001) (analyzing this question).
107. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
108. Id. at 613.
109. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25.
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of “economic” activities that the statute regulated. The House Report on
LARA deemed the regulated activity to be not the jurisdiction of state courts
but the “recovery” that a personal injury claim allows—an economic
activity.110 Assuming that this was a permissible characterization of the
regulated activity in the tort context, it is not clear that Congress could
likewise deem the “liability” a criminal law imposes an “economic” activity.
The question, in any event, whether a federal choice-of-forum law in abortion
cases regulated an “economic” activity would not be abortion-dependent in
concept: to answer it, courts would analyze whether criminal liability for an
abortion-related activity was an economic activity, not balance a state’s interest
in protecting unborn life against an individual’s interest in terminating a
pregnancy.
Even if the Court determined that a federal choice-of-forum clause
qualified as a regulation of “economic” activity, it might have to address
whether such a regulation was “proper” in light of principles of state
sovereignty that the Court has recognized. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
suggested that there are limits on Congress’s power to regulate the jurisdiction
of state courts. In 1912, in Mondou v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford
Railroad Co.,111 the Court held that state courts must enforce actions arising
under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA),112 but specifically noted
that Congress had not attempted in FELA “to enlarge or regulate the
jurisdiction of state courts.”113 In 1947, in Testa v. Katt,114 the Court held that
a state court must enforce a federal action if it has “jurisdiction adequate and
appropriate under established local law to adjudicate [the] action.”115 More
recently, in 1999 in Alden v. Maine,116 the Court explained that Congress
generally “may require state courts of adequate and appropriate jurisdiction to
enforce federal prescriptions.”117 Finally, in 2003, in Jinks v. Richland Co.,118
the Court expressly reserved the question whether Congress generally has
power to regulate practice and procedure in state courts in state law cases.119
Each of these cases at least suggests that there may be a domain of state
authority over state courts that is off-limits to federal regulation.

110. See H.R. REP. NO. 109–123, at 35 (2005).
111. 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
112. Id. at 59.
113. Id. at 56; see also Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876) (explaining that federal
rights of action are enforceable in state court, so long as the state court is “competent to decide
rights of the like character and class”).
114. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
115. Id. at 394.
116. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
117. Id. at 752 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
118. 538 U.S. 456 (2003).
119. Id. at 464–65.
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It is worth pausing for a moment on Jinks. In Jinks, the Court addressed
whether Congress had authority to provide for the tolling of state statutes of
limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Section 1367 gives federal district courts
“supplemental jurisdiction” over certain state law claims. It tolls the statute of
limitations on state law claims brought within a district court’s supplemental
jurisdiction but over which the district court ultimately declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.120 The respondents argued in Jinks that the tolling
provision was “not a ‘proper’ exercise of Congress’s Article I powers [to
regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts] because it violates principles of
state sovereignty” insofar as Congress lacks authority to regulate state court
“procedure” in state law cases.121 (In Printz v. United States,122 the Court had
explained that, under the Necessary and Proper Clause,123 “[w]hen a [l]aw for
carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state
sovereignty reflected in . . . various constitutional provisions . . . , it is not a
[l]aw proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause.”124) In Jinks,
the Court rejected the argument that the tolling provision was not a “proper”
regulation on the ground that a statute of limitations was “substantive,” not
“procedural,” to the extent the distinction is meaningful in this context.125
The Jinks analysis helps frame constitutional questions of state sovereignty
that the Court could face if Congress were to regulate the jurisdiction of state
courts in abortion cases. In determining whether a regulation of commerce is
“proper” in light of principles of state sovereignty, the Court has employed
three paradigms in recent years: (1) non-interference with “traditional state
functions,” (2) anti-commandeering, and (3) non-interference with incidents of
state sovereignty evidenced by principles of English law or the law of nations.
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,126 the Court rejected
the “traditional governmental functions” paradigm as an independent limit on
federal authority;127 accordingly, only the last two paradigms warrant
examination here.
In New York v. United States, the Court held that Congress may not
“commandeer” a state legislature to enact a federal regulatory program.128 In
Printz v. United States, the Court held that Congress may not “commandeer”

120. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2000).
121. Jinks, 538 U.S. at 464.
122. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . . .”).
124. Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
125. Jinks, 538 U.S. at 464–65.
126. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
127. Id. at 530–31 (overruling Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
128. 505 U.S. 144, 202 (1992).
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state executive officials to enforce a federal regulatory program.129 In both
cases, the Court was careful to explain that Congress does not
unconstitutionally commandeer state courts when it requires them to enforce
federal law. In New York, the Court explained that “[f]ederal statutes
enforceable in state courts do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce them,
but this sort of federal ‘direction’ of state judges is mandated by the text of the
Supremacy Clause.”130 In Printz, the Court explained that the Constitution
does “permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal
prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions related to matters appropriate for
the judicial power.”131 Neither New York nor Printz addressed, however, the
power of Congress to regulate the procedure or jurisdiction of state courts. In
Reno v. Condon,132 the Court explained New York and Printz as prohibiting
Congress from “seek[ing] to control or influence the manner in which States
regulate private parties” but allowing Congress to regulate individual or “state
activities.”133 If Congress prescribed the state forum in which an abortion case
must be brought, the Court might have to address whether this prescription
constituted, on the one hand, a regulation of individual or state activities, or, on
the other hand, a regulation of the manner in which states regulate private
parties.134 The answer to this question would not appear to be abortiondependent, but rather dependent upon overarching commitments to a federalstate balance of power.
The Court also could analyze the question of congressional authority to
regulate state court jurisdiction in the way that it has analyzed questions of
state sovereign immunity: by examining whether such a regulation would
interfere with an incident of state sovereignty that the common law or law of
nations recognized at the time of the Founding. In Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida,135 the Court explained that state sovereign immunity has its roots
“not solely in the common law of England, but in the much more fundamental
‘jurisprudence in all civilized nations.’”136 Participants in ratification debates,
members of the first Congresses, and state court judges during the Founding
era and subsequent decades largely premised arguments about congressional

129. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
130. New York, 505 U.S. at 178–79.
131. Printz, 521 U.S. at 907.
132. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
133. Id. at 150 (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514–15 (1988)).
134. See Bellia, supra note 106, at 970–92 (analyzing state sovereignty issues, including anticommandeering issues, that the Court might face if Congress were to regulate state court
procedures).
135. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
136. Id. at 69 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890)) (citations omitted). In Alden
v. Maine, the Court rooted sovereign immunity more in English law than the law of nations. 527
U.S. 706, 715–16 (1999).
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power over state court jurisdiction on principles of sovereignty derived from
the law of nations.137 Most notably, they premised arguments about whether
Congress could require or even allow state courts to hear federal criminal cases
on principles of the law of nations thought to inhere in the constitutional
structure.138
Today, historical arguments that Congress lacks power to regulate state
court jurisdiction in state law cases might well identify incidents of sovereignty
defined by the law of nations and argued by members of the Founding
generation to limit congressional power. Counterarguments might well reject
such principles in favor of a process-based theory of American federalism—
one that views “procedural” or “political safeguards of federalism” as the
primary, if not exclusive, check on federal power relative to state power.139
Framed this way, the issue whether Congress has authority to enact choice-offorum laws for state courts in state law cases would depend on commitments to
the balance of federal and state power, not the relative interests of states and
individuals in the practice of abortion. Regardless of the merits of these
positions, normative claims about federalism would more likely drive the
Court’s analysis than normative claims about the relative interests of a state in
regulating women in procuring abortions. In other words, the constitutional
analysis of congressional power to provide a choice-of-forum rule to umpire
state authority over abortion would most likely be non-abortion-dependent.
C. Summary
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the possibility, if not the likelihood,
that the Court would address most questions of federal authority to regulate
abortion in a post-Roe world under rules or standards that are not abortiondependent. The Court likely would resolve questions of congressional power
to regulate abortion directly under the “substantial effects” test—a test
concerned with the relationship between a regulated activity and commerce—
not with whether state regulation of abortion is inherently justified. As for
congressional regulation of state regulation of abortion, it is more difficult to
identify the “test” the Court would invoke. It seems safe to say, however, at
least that the Court would review federal choice-of-forum rules in abortion
cases under familiar Commerce Clause and state sovereignty paradigms—
paradigms that in terms implicate normative commitments to congressional
137. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction,
94 GEO. L.J. 949 (2006) (describing issues of congressional power and state court jurisdiction
that were discussed during the Founding period and subsequent decades, and the general law
principles that animated the discussions).
138. See id. at 966–90 (describing such arguments).
139. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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and state power, not the relative interests of government and individuals in the
practice of abortion.
III. FEDERALISM DOCTRINES AND REGULATORY OUTCOMES
As Parts I and II demonstrate, it is possible that, in a post-Roe world,
abortion-dependent standards would govern most questions of state power to
regulate abortion while non-abortion-dependent standards would govern most
questions of federal power to regulate abortion. Accordingly, the extent to
which the controversial balancing of Roe and Casey would endure if the Court
overruled those cases could depend on which political institutions sought to
regulate abortion and how.
It is interesting to ponder why state authority to regulate abortion might
well implicate abortion-dependent standards while federal authority to regulate
abortion might well implicate non-abortion-dependent standards. Though a
full exploration of this question is beyond the scope of this Essay, it is at least
worth observing the differing roles the Court has identified for itself in
assessing the regulatory authority of states and the federal government.
In determining state authority to regulate relative to other states, the Court
has long deemed some degree of “umpiring” discretion necessary. Consider
the standard that a plurality articulated in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague140
(and the Court adopted in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts141) for determining
when, consistent with the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses, a
state may enforce its own laws: “[F]or a State’s substantive law to be selected
in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”142 Implicit in
this standard is the idea that, for any given set of facts generating a lawsuit, the
laws of more than one state may constitutionally apply.143 The Court has
acknowledged—even embraced—the degree of discretion that such an interestbalancing standard contemplates for courts. In determining whether any given
state has “power” to apply its own laws to a given dispute relative to the power

140. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
141. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
142. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 312–13 (plurality opinion); see Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818 (invoking
and applying the Allstate standard as the governing standard).
143. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 307 (“Implicit in this inquiry is the recognition, long accepted
by this Court, that a set of facts giving rise to a lawsuit, or a particular issue within a lawsuit, may
justify, in constitutional terms, application of the law of more than one jurisdiction.”); see also
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 823 (“[W]e reaffirm our observation in Allstate that in many situations a state
court may be free to apply one of several choices of law.”).
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of another state,144 the Court in Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial
Accident Commission145 found it “unavoidable” that a court “determine for
itself the extent to which the statute of one state may qualify or deny rights
asserted under the statute of another.”146 To make that determination, a court
must “apprais[e] the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turn[] the
scale of decision according to their weight.”147
The same could largely be said of the Court’s “negative” Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. To determine whether a state regulation impermissibly
burdens interstate commerce (and thus out-of-state interests), the Court has
embraced an open-ended, case-by-case analysis of state interests. In West
Lynn Creamery v. Healy,148 the Court explained its Dormant “Commerce
Clause jurisprudence is not so rigid as to be controlled by the form by which a
State erects barriers to commerce. Rather [its] cases have eschewed formalism
for a sensitive, case-by-case analysis of purposes and effects.”149 In this
context, Justice Thomas has argued:
Any test that requires us to assess (1) whether a particular statute serves a
“legitimate” local public interest; (2) whether the effects of the statute on
interstate commerce are merely “incidental” or “clearly excessive in relation to
the putative benefits”; (3) the “nature” of the local interest; and (4) whether
there are alternative means of furthering the local interest that have a “lesser
impact” on interstate commerce, and even then makes the question “one of
degree,” surely invites us, if not compels us, to function more as legislators
150
than as judges.

It is perhaps unsurprising that those
discretionary balancing tests—Justice
rejected an open-ended “negative”
determined state regulatory authority
categorical tests.151

Justices who strongly eschew such
Thomas and Justice Scalia—have
Commerce Clause and otherwise
relative to other states under more

144. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930) (holding that Texas was “without
power” to affect an insurance contract when “nothing in any way relating to the policy sued on, or
to the contracts of reinsurance, was ever done or required to be done in Texas”).
145. 294 U.S. 533 (1935).
146. Id. at 547.
147. Id.
148. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
149. Id. at 201.
150. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 619 (1997)
(Thomas, J. dissenting).
151. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (reasoning, in the plurality
opinion by Justice Scalia, that a state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person present in
the court’s territorial jurisdiction under long-established, categorical practice); Sun Oil v.
Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (reasoning, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, that a state may apply
its own statute of limitations to claims otherwise governed by the law of another state under longestablished, categorical choice-of-law practices). See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
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Contrast questions of federal authority to regulate, for which the Court
recently has eschewed tests calling for discretionary determinations of
governmental “interests” in the particular subject-matter of a dispute. To
determine whether Congress has regulated “commerce” under its Article I
powers, the Court has employed the “substantial effects” test: Congress may
“regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”152 Though critics have
charged that this test is malleable and expansive, the test, by its terms, does not
call upon a court to determine the nature and strength of any inherent federal
interest in regulating a particular activity. Rather, the test calls upon the court
to determine how a regulated activity relates to interstate commerce. Thus,
though the test appears to give wide berth to courts in classifying activities as
“economic” or aggregating a relevant “class of activities,” the ultimate inquiry
is how regulated activity relates to commerce, not what inherent interest
Congress may have in regulating the activity.
In determining the scope of federal power, not only has the Court not
assessed inherent federal interests in regulating a given activity; it has
generally rejected a test that would limit federal power according to whether
there exist inherent state interests in regulating that activity. In National
League of Cities v. Usery,153 the Court struck down a federal statute regulating
wages and hours of state employees on the ground that it would
“impermissibly interfere with the integral governmental functions” of states.154
Nine years later, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,155
the Court overruled Usery, rejecting the “traditional state functions” test. The
Court provided two main reasons for refusing to limit federal power based on
the existence of a “traditional” or “integral” state interest in the regulated
activities.156 First, it found the test “unworkable” in practice.157 The Court
found it “difficult, if not impossible, to identify an organizing principle”
rendering certain state functions integral and others not so.158 Second, the
Court found that no test that “purports to separate out important governmental
functions” for purposes of defining federal regulatory power “can be faithful to
the role of federalism in a democratic society.”159 “Any rule of state immunity
that looks to the ‘traditional,’ ‘integral,’ or ‘necessary’ nature of governmental

as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (arguing for “general rules” rather than
“personal discretion” in judicial decision-making).
152. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).
153. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
154. Id. at 851.
155. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
156. Id. at 546.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 539.
159. Id. at 546.
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functions,” the Court found, “inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary
to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it
dislikes.”160 Accordingly, the Court rejected any limitation on federal
regulatory power based on a state’s “integral” or “traditional” interest in
regulating a given area in favor of a process-based theory of federalism. Under
Garcia’s process-based theory, the political safeguards of federalism inherent
in the federal lawmaking procedures that the Constitution provides are
generally sufficient to protect the interests of the states under the American
constitutional structure.161
Of course, the Court has not fully embraced procedural and political
safeguards as the sole safeguards of state interests and autonomy under the
American Constitution. In New York and Printz, the Court held that Congress
may not commandeer state legislatures and executive officials to enact or
enforce federal law.162 In Seminole Tribe and Alden, the Court held that
Congress lacks power to subject states to suit in federal or state court based on
principles of state sovereign immunity.163 Indeed, in United States v. Lopez164
and United States v. Morrison,165 cases in which the Court held that certain
congressional regulations of guns near schools and acts of sexual violence
against women were beyond the commerce power, the Court noted that the
respective regulations were in areas that states traditionally regulated. In
Lopez, the Court explained that if Congress could regulate guns near schools, it
could, by extension, generally regulate “areas such as criminal law
enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign.”166
Similarly, in Morrison, the Court explained that “[t]he regulation and
punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities,
channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the
province of the States.”167
Even if one reads these cases as embracing concepts of “traditional state
functions” (notwithstanding Garcia), none assessed the propriety of federal
regulation as being based on a state’s interest in a particular regulatory
outcome. Rather, in each case, the touchstone of the Court’s reasoning was
that Congress had violated a federalism principle transcending state or federal
interests in particular regulatory outcomes. In the anti-commandeering and
sovereign immunity cases, the Court held categorically that Congress may not
160. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
161. Id. at 544–53 (assessing “[t]he effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving
the States’ interests” under the constitutional structure).
162. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.
164. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
165. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
166. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
167. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
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require states to enact or enforce any federal regulatory program or authorize
any private action against a state unless a provision of the Constitution
expressly authorizes Congress to do so. In the Commerce Clause cases, the
Court assessed whether Congress was regulating a sufficiently “economic”
activity that “substantially affected” commerce. The point in explaining that
Congress was regulating in an area that states traditionally regulated was that
states have a prerogative to regulate as they wish, not that any state had
demonstrated a sufficiently strong interest in regulating as it had.
Therein lies the difference between how the Court might well assess
questions of federal constitutional power to regulate abortion and state
constitutional power to regulate abortion. In assessing questions of state power
to regulate abortion, the doctrines available to the Court may well lead it to
assess a state’s interest in regulating abortion in a particular way. As Professor
Fallon points out, a general conflict-of-laws “interest analysis” might lead a
court to assess the strength of a state’s interest in regulating abortion as the
state has regulated it.168 In assessing questions of congressional power under
the Commerce Clause, on the other hand, the Court has asked whether
Congress has power relative to principles that transcend federal and state
interests in particular regulatory outcomes.
The relevance of these observations to the question of what the judicial
role would be in cases relating to abortion in a post-Roe world is evident. In
cases involving state regulation of abortion, governing standards (and the
Court’s self-identified role in applying those standards) could enable the Court
to make assessments regarding a state’s inherent interest in regulating the
practice of abortion in particular ways. In cases involving federal regulation of
abortion, governing standards (and the Court’s self-identified role in applying
those standards) could limit the Court to assessing relative federal and state
power according to positive markers unrelated to the inherent interest of any
government in regulating abortion in a particular way.
CONCLUSION
Professor Fallon is surely correct that, were the Court to overrule Roe v.
Wade, political actors within the federal system could take regulatory actions
that would generate constitutional questions relating to abortion.169 This Essay
merely proposes a refinement on that analysis. Under current federalism
doctrines, questions relating to state power to regulate abortion may well
involve assessments of the legitimacy of state interests in regulating abortion in
particular ways. On the other hand, questions relating to federal power to
regulate abortion might well involve assessments of the balance of federal and
state power based on interests that transcend the perceived worth of particular
168. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
169. Fallon, supra note 1, at 612–14.
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regulatory outcomes. Thus, whether post-Roe courts would remain involved in
deciding questions of the legitimacy of governmental interests in regulating
abortion in particular ways may well depend on the kind of governmental
regulation that emerged in a post-Roe world.

